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NOTES

FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE
DECEDENT S ESTATE AND THEIR
EFFECT IN ILLINOIS*
Since the federal estate tax is a tax imposed upon the right to pass
property at death,1 the Internal Revenue Code 2 provides that certain items
are deductible from the decendent's gross estate to assure that the tax is
3
imposed upon only the property which is actually transferred at death.
One of these deductions allowed under the Code, the deduction for claims
against the estate, 4 has aroused considerable controversy because neither the
Code nor the Treasury Regulations specify what effect events subsequent to
the decedent's death should have on the valuation of claims against the
5
decedent's estate.
Section 2053(a) of the Code merely requires that the value of the
taxable estate be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate
such amounts for claims against the estate as are allowable under the laws of
the jurisdiction in which the estate is being administered.8 Section 20.2053-4
* The assistance provided by Ruth Goldman of the law firm of Devoe, Shadur
& Krupp of Chicago, Illinois in the development of this article is acknowledged with
gratitude.
1. C. LowNDEs, R. KRAMER, & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXES §
1.1 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as LowtNDEs]; 1 H. HARRIs, FEDERAL ESTATE &
GIFT TAXES

§ 2 (2d ed. J. Rasch rev. 1972) [hereinafter cited as

HARRis].

2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 [hereinafter referred to in the text as the Code].
Under section 2053 of the Code, funeral expenses, administrative expenses, claims
against the estate, unpaid mortgages on property includable in the gross estate, and certain state and foreign death takes are deductible. Casualty losses incurred during the
settlement of the estate, charitable contributions, and bequests to the surviving spouse
are also deductible under sections 2054, 2055 and 2056 of the Code respectively.
3. John Jacobs, 34 B.T.A. 594, 597 (1936), remanded on stipulation, 95 F.2d
1006 (6th Cir. 1938). Accord, Commissioner v. Shively's Estate, 276 F.2d 372, 375
(2d Cir. 1960), rev'g 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 965 (1958); Kahn v. United States, 20
F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a)(3).
5. Since section 20.2053-1(b)(3) of the Treasury Regulations provides that "[n]o
deduction may be taken upon the basis of a vague or uncertain estimate," events subsequent to the decedent's death must be considered when valuing disputed or contingent
claims. It is only when claims against the estate are certain in amount and enforceable
at the decedent's death, that it is unclear whether later events, which alter the amount
necessary to discharge the claim, should be considered in valuing the claim.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053 (a), in pertinent part, reads as follows:
General Rule. For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the

NOTES

of the Treasury Regulations simply limits the deduction for claims against a
decedent's estate to those claims which are enforceable under the laws of the

jurisdiction where the estate is being administered. 7 As a result, neither the
Code nor the Treasury Regulations state when claims against the 8estate
should be valued and two theories have developed to fill this void: (1)
value of the claims should be determined as of the date of death and
subsequent events are irrelevant, and (2) only claims actually paid or to be
paid should be allowed and subsequent events which change the amount or
nature of a claim existing at death should control. 9 The Commissioner's
value of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of
the gross estate such amounts(3) for claims against the estate.
as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the
United States, under which the estate is being administered.
Since estates which are subject to the federal estate tax may come into existence
in any one of the fifty states and are governed by the intestate or testate laws of such
states, it is a basic principle of federal estate taxation that the extent of a decedent's
interest in property at the time of his death is generally determined by state law even
though the question of what is subject to the federal tax is determined by the federal
law. That is, the general laws of each state concerning estate administration and creditor's rights with respect to decedent's estates control. 1 HAmuRs, supra note 1, § 7; 34
AM. JUR. 2d FederalTaxation § 8507 (1973).
For a more detailed discussion of this provision, see LOWNDES, supra note 1, § 15.5;
4 J. MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 26.16 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
7. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958), in pertinent part, reads as follows:
Deduction for claims against the estate; in general.
• . . Only claims enforceable against the decedent's estate may be deducted ....
Three additional limitations on the deductibility of claims against the estate have
been imposed under the Code and the Treasury Regulations:
(1) In order for the items enumerated in section 2053 (a) of the Code to be deductible, they may not exceed the value of the property included in the gross estate
which is subject to claims. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(c)(2). Under the Treasury Regulations, the total allowable amount of deductions is expanded to include
amounts paid out of property not subject to claims against the decedent's estate within
nine months after the decedent's death (the period within which the federal estate tax
return must be filed under section 6075 of the Code) or within any extension of time
for filing the return granted under section 6081 of the Code. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053l(c) (1958).
(2) A claim founded on a promise or agreement is deductible only to the extent
that it is contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(c) (1) (A). For more detailed discussion of this provision, see LowNDES, supra note 1, § 15.14; 4 MERTENS, supra note 6,
§§ 26.21-26.23.
(3) A claim must represent a personal obligation of the decedent existing at his
death in order to be deductible. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958). For a more detailed
discussion of this provision, see 4 MERTENS, supra note 6, § 26.40.
8. Comment, Effect of Events Subsequent to the Decedent's Death on the Valuation of Claims Against His Estate Under Section 2053 of the Federal Estate Tax, 1972
U. ILL. L.F. 770, 776; Comment, Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate
and Events Subsequent to Date of Death, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 654, 672 (1975).
9. Examples of subsequent events which might change the amount or nature of
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position in a recent Tax Court decision, Estate of Frank G. Hagmann,1 0 and
12
two recent Revenue Rulings" indicate that the Internal Revenue Service
has adopted the latter theory.
Acceptance by the IRS of the position that events subsequent to the
decedent's death should be considered in determining the value of claims
against the decedent's estate has widespread ramifications in Illinois because
Illinois precedent is contrary to the IRS position on this issue. 1 3 At the

present time, the determining factor in Illinois is that the claim is enforceable
on the date of death and the fact that the nature or amount of the claim is
changed by events subsequent to the decedent's death is immaterial. Be-

cause of this conflict between Illinois precedent and the IRS position, it is
unclear at this moment whether claims which are enforceable at the decedent's death, but which under Illinois law become unenforceable due to
events subsequent to the decedent's death, are deductible under section
14
2053 of the Code and section 20.2053 of the Treasury Regulations.
Most of the writers who have examined the effect of events subsequent
to the decedent's death on the valuation of claims against the estate 15 have
only suggested answers to the question of whether events subsequent to the
decedent's death should be considered when valuing claims against the
decedent's estate and have not discussed the effect of the IRS position on the
deductibility of such claims in light of a particular state's pertinent statutes.1 6
a claim existing at the date of death are: compromising the claim for a lesser amount
(Commissioner v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (Ist Cir. 1942); Estate of Isaac
W. Baldwin, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 902 (1959), reopened on other grounds, 20 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 339 (1961), appeal dismissed, (3d Cir., June 24, 1963) (unpublished
opinion); abandonment by the creditor (Jacobs v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.
1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929)); extinguishment by legislative act (John
Jacobs, 34 B.T.A. 594 (1936), remanded on stipulation, 95 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1938));
payment of the debt by someone other than the estate (Buck v. Helvering, 73 F.2d 760
(9th Cir. 1934)); occurrence of a condition subsequent (Commissioner v. Shively's
Estate, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960), rev'g 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 965 (1958)); creditor's failure to file a claim against the decedent's estate within the statutory claim period
(Russell v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Winer v. United States,
153 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)).
10. 60 T.C. 465 (1973), aff'd per curiam, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974).
11. Rev. Rul. 75-24, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 3, at 35; Rev. Rul. 75-177, 1975
INT. REV. BULL. No. 19, at 21.
12. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the IRS.
13. Russell v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1966), stands for the
proposition that subsequent events are not to be considered when valuing claims against
the estate. See notes 36-44, 77-79 infra and accompanying text.
14. This writer has been advised that the Chicago Bar Association Committee on
Probate Practice has established a special subcommittee to consider this issue.
15. See periodicals cited note 8 supra.
16. The only article which has discussed this issue, Note, Taxation-Income and Estate Taxes-Claims Against the Decedent's Estate, 10 WAKE FOR. L. REV. 328 (1974),
did not discuss in detail the provisions under section 2053 of the Code and section
20.2053 of the Treasury Regulations regarding claims against the estate and the cases
which consider when claims against the estate should be valued.
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By way of contrast, this note will not consider how that question should
finally be resolved but will analyze instead the possible far-reaching consequences of the IRS position in Illinois under the applicable Illinois statute.
The first section of this note will examine the major cases which discuss
when claims against the estate should be valued. The second section will
review the Revenue Rulings which delineate the IRS position on this
problem. Finally, the third section will analyze the effect the IRS position
will have in Illinois in light of the applicable Illinois statute and will consider
approaches which might be taken to avoid having claims against the
decedent's estate disallowed because of events subsequent to the decedent's
death.
THE CASE LAW

Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States17 is the only United States Supreme
Court decision to consider whether the value of a deduction should be
determined by facts known at the decedent's death or in light of events
happening after the decedent's death but before the calculation of the federal
estate tax. In Ithaca Trust the decedent left his estate in trust and gave his
wife a life estate in the corpus of the trust and power to withdraw as much of
the principal as might be necessary to continue the standard of living she
then enjoyed. At her death the remainder was bequeathed to charity.
Under section 403(a)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1918,18 the estate was
allowed to deduct gifts to charity to arrive at the value of the net estate and
the tax payable thereon. When the decedent's wife died before the federal
estate tax return was filed, it was unclear whether the value of the charitable
deduction should be the value of the residuary estate at the decedent's death
less the value of the wife's interest for her actual life or less the value of the
wife's interest estimated by mortality tables. The Court reasoned that the
word "value" depended on certain predictions of the future and, since value
was no less real if the prediction turned out to be false, held that "ft]he
estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of the testator's death."' 9
Thus, according to Ithaca Trust, subsequent events should not be considered
when determining the value of the deductions allowed under the Code.
Even though Ithaca Trust is a United States Supreme Court decision
concerned with the valuation of deductions from the decedent's gross estate,
it is not controlling authority on valuation of the deduction for claims against
17. 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
18. Rev. Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1098 (now INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 2055).
19. 279 U.S. at 155. One author has noted that "[w]hile Ithaca Trust remains
a strong authori.ty on the issue of date of death valuation and mortality tables, the result
with regard to charitable remainder trusts has been changed. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2055, as amended 26 U.S.C. § 2055 (1970) (Tax Reform Act of 1969)." Comment,
Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate and Events Subsequent to Date of
Death, 22 U.C.L.A. L REv. 654, 673 n.105 (1975).
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the estate because it deals with a different deduction, the one for charitable
contributions. 20 For this reason, Ithaca Trust was distinguished on its facts
in Jacobs v. Commissioner.2 1 In Jacobs the decedent prior to death entered
into an antenuptial contract with his widow in which it was agreed that she
would be paid $75,000 out of his estate upon his death in lieu of her dower
and marital rights. In addition, the decedent's will provided that his widow
could choose to be paid during her lifetime the net income from $250,000 of
his estate instead of the $75,000 under the terms of the antenuptial contract.
Before the federal estate tax return was filed, the widow notified the
executors of her husband's estate that she had decided to take the life estate
under the will rather than the lump sum under the antenuptial contract.
Despite the fact that the $75,000 contractual obligation was never going to
be paid, the executors deducted it on the federal estate tax return because
the widow's claim under the antenuptial contract was an existing and
enforceable claim against the estate at the time of her husband's death. The
court rejected this argument and held that the $75,000 was not deductible
because it concluded that Congress had only intended claims which were
22
actually paid or were going to be paid to be deductible.
In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged that under Ithaca
Trust there were deductions which could only be determined by facts and
conditions existing at the date of death. The court distinguished Ithaca
Trust, however, on the grounds that it was concerned with the value of a
charitable deduction under section 403(a)(3) 23 while Jacobs was concerned
with the value of a deduction for claims against the estate under section
403(a)(1). 2 4 Since section 403(a)(1) also allowed funeral and administrative expenses as deductions and since these expenses must be ascertained
by facts and circumstances which arise after death, the court held that Ithaca
Trust was not controlling and that subsequent events must be considered
when valuing claims against the estate.2 5 In support of its decision, the
20. See notes 23 and 24 intra and accompanying text.
21. 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929).

22. 34 F.2d at 235.
OF
OF

23. Rev. Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 403(a)(3), 42 Stat. 279-280 (now INT. REV.
1954, § 2055).
24. Rev. Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 403(a)(1), 42 Stat. 279 (now INr. REv.
1954, § 2053).

CODE
CODE

25. 34 F.2d at 236. But see Estate of Carlton A. Shively, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mere.

965, 967-968 (1958), which rejected the Jacobs rationale because that case and the cases

which had adopted it (Estate of William P. Metcalf, 7 T.C. 153 (1946), afI'd, 47-2 U.S.

Tax Cas. 12,992 (6th Cir. 1947) and Estate of Ethel M. DuVal, 4 T.C. 722 (1945),
afi'd, 152 F.2d 103 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 838 (1946)) involved situations where

the estate was disputing its liability for a claim, where the claim was compromised or
relinquished, or where the event considered was not subject to a probable estimate at
the time of decedent's death. The court held that Jacobs and the decisions which had
followed it did not stand "for the proposition that actual events occurring after the decedent's death may be substituted for the estimate of probable events made as of the
time of the decedent's death and based upon circumstances as they existed at that time."
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court also emphasized the fact that this conclusion was in harmony with the
regulations of the Treasury Department. 26 Since the United States Supreme
Court has not considered when the deduction for claims against the estate
should be valued, the Jacobs rationale that subsequent events must be
considered when determining the value of claims against the estate has been
27
interpreted by some courts as being more persuasive than Ithaca Trust.
Although all of the cases involving claims against the estate since 1929
followed Jacobs,28 in 1957 the courts began to adhere to the Jacobs
rationale with less consistency. 29 The first departure, Winer v. United
States,3 0 is especially noteworthy because it is the first case to cite Ithaca
Trust and apply its rationale in determining whether subsequent events
should be considered when valuing claims against the estate. In Winer the
decedent's daughter had a valid and enforceable claim against her mother's
estate but through inadvertence failed to file her claim with the probate court
in accordance with the Florida statute which stated that claims not so filed
were void. 3l The court interpreted the term "allowed" in section 2053(a)
of the Code3 2 to mean that a claim against the estate does not have to be
17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 967-968. This case, however, was reversed in Commissioner
v. Shively's Estate, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960).
26. Article 32 of Regulation 63, 1922 Edition, provides:
An item may be entered on the return for deduction though the exact amount
thereof is not then known, provided it is ascertainable with reasonable certainty, and will be paid. No deduction may be taken upon the basis of a vague
or uncertain estimate ...
34 F.2d at 236.
27. Estate of Frank G. Hagmann, 60 T.C. 465 (197.3), aff'd per curiam, 492 F.2d
796 (5th Cir. 1974); Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963); Commissioner v. Shively's Estate, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960), rev'g 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
965 (1958); Commissioner v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (lst Cir. 1942);
Estate of William P. Metcalf, 7 T.C. 153 (1946), afI'd, 47-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,992 (6th
Cir. 1947); John Jacobs, 34 B.T.A. 594 (1936), remanded on stipulation, 95 F.2d 1006
(6th Cir. 1938).
28. Commissioner v. State Street Trust CQ., 128 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942); Buck
v. Helvering, 73 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1934); Estate of William P. Metcalf, 7 T.C. 153
(1946), a! 'd, 47-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,992 (6th Cir. 1947); John Jacobs, 34 B.T.A. 594
(1936), remanded on stipulation, 95 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1938).
29. "Although Smyth v. Erickson, 221 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1955), and Commissioner
v. Strauss, 77 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1935), have been cited for the proposition that subsequent events are irrelevant in valuing claims against the estate, these cases did not
squarely decide the issue." Comment, Effect of Events Subsequent to the Decedent's
Death on the Valuation of Claims Against His Estate Under Section 2053 of the Federal
Estate Tax, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 770, 779 n.72.
30. 153 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
31. The court in Winer stated that only Florida had such a nonclaim statute. 153
F. Supp. at 943. While this may have been true when Winer was decided in 1957,
this is not true today. Creditors must file valid claims with the probate court within
a specified period after death in states such as Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico and Utah. Note, Taxation-Income and Estate TaxesClaims Against the Decedent's Estate, 10 WAKE FOR. L. REv. 328, 329 n.5 (1974).
32. The fact that the word "allowable" has been substituted for "allowed" in the
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allowed by the state court in order to be deductible"3 and applied the Ithaca
Trust rationale without citing or distinguishing any of the previous decisions
to the contrary. Since the federal estate tax payable must be determined as
of the date of death, the court held that the daughter's claim, which was
enforceable at the time of the decedent's death, was deductible and adopted
the theory that subsequent events should not be considered in determining
the value of claims against the estate. 34 It was in response to Winer that the5
first Revenue Ruling expressing the IRS position, Revenue Ruling 60-247,
was issued.
Another case which departed from the Jacobs rationale was Russell v.
United States.3 6 Although it followed the majority of decisions since 1957 by
adopting Ithaca Trust and rejecting Jacobs37 without adding anything to the
development of the case law in this area, it is particularly significant because
it is the only case which applies to Illinois law in determining whether
subsequent events should be considered when valuing claims against the
decedent's estate.3 8 In Russell the court was faced with a factual situation
identical to Winer. The decedent's husband had left each of their two
children several thousand shares of stock in a trust to be administered by
their mother. The decedent subsequently sold the stock and comingled the
proceeds with her own funds. After her death, the two children learned of
the existence of these trust funds and filed claims against her estate with the
probate court after the period for filing claims under the Illinois statute had
run. 39 At this time section 204 of the Illinois Probate Act 40 created a nine
month period of limitation on claims against an estate which may be paid
from estate assets inventoried within that period.4 1 The probate court
allowed the claims even though they were filed after the period of limitation
on claims had run and they were taken as deductions on the federal estate
tax return. The government contended, however, that since the children's
claims were unenforceable under state law at the time they were filed with
the probate court, they were not deductible.
current Code has no effect on the applicability of this decision. 4
6, § 26.16.

MERTENS,

supra note

33. Accord, Smyth v. Erickson, 221 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1955); Commissioner v.
Strauss, 77 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1935); Buck v. Helvering, 73 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1934).
34. 153 F. Supp. at 943-44.

35. Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 272. See text at notes 55-59 inra.
36. 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1966).

37. Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963); Estate of Isaac W.
Baldwin, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 902 (1959), reopened on other grounds, 20 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 339 (1961), appeal dismissed, (3d Cir., June 24, 1963); Estate of Carlton A.
Shively, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 965 (1958), rev'd, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960).

38. See notes 77-79 infra and accompanying text.
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 204 (1939).
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 1 et seq. (1939).
41. Section 204 of the Illinois Probate Act has been amended and now allows a
six month claim period. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 204 (1939), as amended, ILL. REV.
SrAT. ch. 3, § 204 (1973).
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In order to determine whether these claims against the estate were
deductible under section 2053 of the Code, the court had to refer to the
applicable Illinois statute and to the cases which had construed section 204
of the Illinois Probate Act. In so doing, the court noted that section 204 was
not an ordinary statute of limitations which created a defense to be raised or
lost by the party in whose favor the statute operated. Instead, this section
created a nonclaim statute which operated as a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the probate court. Since the children's claims were filed after the
nine month period of limitations and there were no after-inventoried assets
from which their claims could be satisfied, the court found that the probate
court was without jurisdiction and that the order allowing the claims was
42
void.
Because the children's claims against the estate were unenforceable
under Illinois law at the time they were filed with the probate court, it was
then necessary for the court to construe the language of section 2053 of the
Code. By following what it interpreted the persuasive weight of case law to
intend, the court defined the phrase "as are allowable by the laws of the
jurisdiction

. .

.

under which the estate is being administered" to mean that

claims which are allowable at the time of the decedent's death under the
laws of Illinois are deductible. 43 In expressly adopting the Ithaca Trust
rationale, the court held that the determining factor was that the claims were
allowable in Illinois on the date of the decedent's death and the fact that the
44
claims were subsequently lost by lapse of time was found to be irrelevant.
Therefore, Russell agreed with Winer and the tide of cases since 1957 which
adopted Ithaca Trust but disagreed with the IRS position on this issue.
Two of the most recent cases to consider whether subsequent events
should affect the valuation of claims against the estate are Estate of Donald
Albert Lester 45 and Estate of Frank G. Hagmann.46

Until Hagmann, the

most recent cases had rejected Jacobs and it could have been assumed that
Ithaca Trust had become controlling. Therefore, Lester and Hagmann are
noteworthy because they are recent Tax Court cases in which contradictory
decisions resulted and because they indicate that the issue of whether events
subsequent to the decedent's death should be considered when valuing claims
against the decedent's estate still has not been resolved.
In Lester the decedent agreed to pay his former wife $1,000 per month
as alimony until the sum of $130,000 was paid and this liability was to be
binding on his estate. Since the decedent died when only nineteen payments
had been made, the estate was obligated to pay the decedent's former wife
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

260 F. Supp. at 498.
Id. at 499.
Id.
57 T.C. 503 (1972).
60 T.C. 465 (1973), affd per curiam, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974).
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$111,000 in $1,000 monthly installments. After the estate had paid $24,000, the probate court, in order to facilitate the prompt settlement of the
estate, ordered the executor to purchase an annuity which would pay the
decedent's former wife $1,000 per month until the remainder of $87,000
was paid. Although the purchase price of this annuity was $78,700, the
estate took a deduction on the federal estate tax return for the face amount
of the installments outstanding at the date of death. The government
contended, however, that the amount of the deduction should be the
commuted value of this debt based upon actuarial tables. In following
Ithaca Trust, the Tax Court held that there was no need to consider the
effect of events subsequent to the decedent's death and that the value of the
former wife's claim was to be determined as of the date of his death by the
47
use of actuarial tables.
Nevertheless, the opposite result was reached in Hagmann, a Florida
case which is factually similar to both Winer and Russell because all three
-concern nonclaim statutes. In Hagmann the estate deducted debts which
were bona fide obligations at the time of the decedent's death. The applicable
Florida statute48 required that any claim not filed within six months from
the first publication of notice to creditors was void even if -recognized by the
estate's representative. When no claims with respect to such debts were
filed against the estate, the claims became unenforceable under Florida law
and were not paid by the estate.
The Tax Court rejected the executor's position that Ithaca Trust was
controlling, that the debts were deductible because they were bona fide
obligations of the decedent at the time of his death and that it was
inconsequential that the claims subsequently became unenforceable. Instead
the court agreed with Jacobs and held that the debts were void and
unenforceable under the Florida statute because events occurring subsequent
to the decedent's death must be taken into consideration in determining the
deductibility of claims under section 2053(a)(3) of the Code.4 9 In so
holding, the court also rejected the argument that the courts have only
considered events subsequent to death when the claim was contingent5 o
because such an argument was based on too narrow a reading of the cases. 5 1
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished Winer and Russell on the
47. 57 T.C. at 507.

48.

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 733.16 (1969).

49.

60 T.C. at 469.

Accord, Estate of Claire M. Conrad, 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.

1071 (1975). In Conrad decedent's obligation as a guarantor of loans became unenforceable under Kansas law when the creditor failed to file a claim against the estate within
nine months of publication of the first notice to creditors. The Tax Court followed
Jacobs and Hagmann and ruled that if an enforceable claim exists at a decedent's death,
but subsequent events relieve the estate of liability, the claim is not deductible.
50. Accord, Commissioner v. Shively's Estate, 276 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1960), rev'g,
17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 965 (1958).
51. 60 T.C. at 469.

NOTES

grounds that those cases had applied the broad doctrine of Ithaca Trust
without considering the contrary cases which limited the applicability of that
doctrine in the area of claims against the estate. 52 By disagreeing with
Winer and Russell, Hagmann also demonstrated that an underlying consideration in determining whether to consider events subsequent to death when
valuing claims against the estate may be whether such claims have been or
will be paid by the estate. Thus, one of the most recent cases to consider
this issue has adopted the Jacobs rationale by considering events subsequent
to the decedent's death when valuing a claim against the decedent's estate.
In retrospect, it is clear that neither Ithaca Trust nor Jacobs have
become controlling on the question of how events subsequent to the decedent's death should affect the valuation of claims against the estate. Instead,
the determination as to whether Ithaca Trust or Jacobs will prevail depends
upon the jurisdiction. 53 Because the ultimate impact of the federal estate
tax is a matter for state law determination, except as it has been specifically
dealt with in the federal statutes, 54 and because the courts have been unable
to resolve whether claims against the estate should be valued at the date of
death or at some later time, the Commissioner has issued three Revenue
Rulings during the last fifteen years which set forth the IRS position.
THE REVENUE RULINGS

Since the extent to which events which occur subsequent to the decedent's death affect the amount of the deduction otherwise permissible has
been discussed by the IRS in several Revenue Rulings, there is no doubt as
55
to its position on this issue. The first of these, Revenue Ruling 60-247,
was issued as a direct response to and in complete disagreement with the
decision reached in Winer.56 After reviewing the reasoning of several of the
cases which held that subsequent events are to be considered when determining the value of a deduction for claims against the estate, the IRS decided
that a claim against the estate which is enforceable at the time of the
decedent's death 57 will not be allowed as a deduction in a case where the
52. Id.

53. It is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will resolve this issue since
it has denied certiorari in Jacobs v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929), and Estate of Ethel M. DuVal, 4 T.C. 722 (1945), aff'd,
152 F.2d 103 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 838 (1946).
54. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942) (final determination of the ultimate
burden of the federal estate tax is left to individual states except where Congress has
specifically provided to the contrary).
55. Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 272.
56. See text at notes 30-35 supra. By suggesting that the court in Winer determined that no more was needed than enforceability at death to warrant deduction and
attached no importance to the fact that the debt could not be collected, it appears that
the Revenue Ruling was issued to express IRS disapproval of the decision.
57. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958).
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creditor fails to enforce payment.58 As nonexclusive illustrations of what
constituted a failure to enforce payment, the Revenue Ruling specifically
mentioned waivers of payment and failures to file claims under the conditions and within the time limit prescribed by the applicable state law. The
IRS did, however, recognize an exception to this rule when it stated that
". .. a deduction would be allowed for a claim in favor of the sole
beneficiary of an estate, where the claim is not formally presented and not
formally paid, but where it is clear, under the facts of the case, that the claim
may be deemed to have been paid through the payment of the legacy in an
amount at least equal to that of the claim." 59 Since the claim in Winer had
become void because it was not filed within the statutory period, the IRS
impliedly expressed its disagreement with Winer and took the position that
subsequent events should be considered when valuing claims against the
estate.
Two more recent Revenue Rulings" ° indicate that despite the conflict in
interpretation in even the most recent cases considered by the courts, the IRS
still takes the position that claims- which were valid but not filed within the
local claim period and which become barred by reason of a nonclaim statute
are not deductible for federal estate tax purposes. Therefore, evidence of
those events which transpire after the death of a decedent must be considered in valuing claims against the decedent's estate.
,In Revenue Ruling 75-24, the IRS was asked to rule on a situation
where a claim for an unsecured debt was not filed with the probate court
within the Mississippi statutory claim period, 61 the claimant informally
asserted his claim against the executor and the claim was paid after it was
approved by all of the estate's beneficiaries.
The debt was subsequently
deducted as a claim against the decedent's estate on the federal estate tax
return. The Mississippi statute required that all claims against a decedent's
estate be registered, probated and allowed in the probate court within six
months after publication of notice to creditors. The statute also charged the
executor with the duty of promptly paying all claims against the estate and
provided that the executor might be surcharged if a claim was paid without
complying with the requirements of Mississippi law. This statute had been
construed by the local courts to mean that the fiduciary could not be
surcharged where payment of a valid but unprobated claim was made within
the statutory claim period if the claim had been approved by all of the
beneficiaries of the estate within the time in which the claim was enforceable. Since such approval rendered filing of the claim unnecessary to prevent
58. Winer was subsequently followed and Revenue Ruling 60-247 was expressly rejected in Russell.
59.

1960-2 CUM. BULL. at 274.

60. Rev. Rul. 75-24, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 3, at 35; Rev. Rul. 75-177, 1975
INT. REV. BULL. No. 19, at 21.
61. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 91-7-151 (1972).
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surcharge of the executor, the IRS concluded that the claim was allowable as
62
a deduction under section 2053 of the Code.
It is important to note that if approval by all of the beneficiaries of the
estate would not have prevented the executor from being surcharged under
Mississippi law, then the deduction would not have been allowable under
section 2053 of the Code.63 Since no deduction would have been allowed
for the valid but unfiled claim, except for the approval of the beneficiaries,
this Revenue Ruling also stands for the proposition that subsequent events
must be considered in determining the value of a claim against the decedent's estate.
After the Tax Court's decision in Hagmann, the Florida legislature
prospectively amended its nonclaim statute64 in 1973 by adding that an
executor was permitted to pay a claim without the necessity for filing if
payment was either approved by the heirs or beneficiaries adversely affected
or accounted for in accounts to the court and if payment was made within
the claim period.6 5 Even though Revenue Ruling 75-177 was issued in
response to a Florida case, it was concerned with a factual situation almost
identical to that which Revenue Ruling 75-24 was asked to consider. In this
latest Revenue Ruling, the decedent was indebted to an unsecured creditor
who had not filed a claim with the probate court. The creditor, however,
had informally asserted his claim against the executor and had been paid
after the executor obtained the approval of all of the estate's beneficiaries.
This claim was then taken as a deduction on the decedent's federal estate tax
return. The question arose because the Florida statute prior to the postHagmann amendment had been construed to mean that the required filing of
claims could not be waived.
Since the estate was opened prior to the effective date of the statutory
amendment, this claim was not allowable as a deduction under section 2053
of the Code because it was unenforceable under Florida law.'6 The
deduction would have been allowed under Revenue Ruling 75-177, however,
if the administration of the decedent's estate had been begun on or after the
effective date of the statutory amendment. 67 Although this Revenue Ruling
only impliedly adopted Jacobs, it agreed with the previous Revenue Rulings
that subsequent events must be considered in valuing claims against the
decedent's estate.
Since neither the case law nor the Revenue Rulings are controlling, it is
evident that there is no definitive answer to the question on what date claims
62.
63.
64.
65.
(1963).
66.
67.

1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 3, at 35.
Id.
FLA. ANN. STAT.

§ 733.16 (1969).

FLA. ANN. STAT.

§ 733.16 (Supp. 1974), amending FLA.

1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 19, at 22.
Id.

ANN. STAT.

§ 733.16
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against the estate should be valued in order to determine whether they are
deductible under section 2053 of the Code and section 20.2053 of the
Treasury Regulations. Inasmuch as the position taken by the IRS in
Hagmann and the Revenue Rulings that events subsequent to the date of
death are to be considered in valuing claims against the estate is in conflict
with the only Illinois case on this issue, Russell, the crucial question is
whether the IRS position will have any effect in Illinois. The next section of
this note will suggest answers to this question and will consider possible
approaches that might be taken.
APPLICATION TO ILLINOIS

Because section 2053(a) of the Code provides that only claims against
the estate which are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the
estate is being administered and section 20.2053-4 of the Treasury Regulations states that only claims enforceable against the decedent's estate may be
deducted, 68 it is necessary to look at the applicable provisions of the Illinois
Probate Act6 9 to determine whether a claim which is enforceable on the date
of death but which changes in either nature or amount due to events
subsequent to the decedent's death is deductible.
Section 204 of the Act 70 creates a six month period of limitation on
claims against the estate which may be paid from estate assets inventoried
within six months from the issuance of letters of office. Section 204 also
provides that claims not filed within the six month claim period may be paid
from assets discovered after six months from the issuance of letters, if the
executor files an inventory listing those assets not previously inventoried and
publishes a notice stating that claims may still be filed against the estate for
an additional six months. If the claimant does not file his claim with the
probate court during this additional claim period, then the claim is absolutely
68. See notes 6 and 7 supra.
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 1 et seq. (1973) [hereinafter referred to in the text
as the Act]. As this article went to press, the Probate Act was renumbered in the Probate Act of 1975, ch. 3, §§ 1-1 et seq., [1975] Ill. Laws 404. Hereinafter the new section
in the Probate Act of 1975 will be noted in parentheses.
70. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 204 (1973) (now § 18-12), in pertinent part, reads
as follows:

Limitations on payment of claims
(a) All claims against the estate of a decedent, except expenses of administration and surviving spouse's or child's award, not filed within 6 months
from the issuance of letters of office are barred as to the estate which has been

inventoried within 6 months from the issuance of letters. If after 6 months
from the issuance of letters the representative files -an inventory listing estate
not previously inventoried and thereafter the clerk of the court publishes once
each week for 3 successive weeks a notice informing all persons that claims
may be filed against the estate on or before a date as designated in the publication . . ., all claims not filed on or before the designated date are barred as
to the estate listed in such inventory.
(b) All claims barrable under this Section are, in any event, barred unless
letters of office are issued upon the estate of the decedent within 3 years after
his death.
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barred as to the inventoried estate. This does not mean, however, that
claims cannot be paid out of noninventoried assets in the estate.
Section 204 of the Act has been construed by the Illinois Supreme
Court to be a specific act adopted for the particular purpose of facilitating

the early settlement of estates and, therefore, is not a general statute of
limitations which takes away all remedies whether personal or against the
property of the decedent. 71 Because section 204 does not operate as an
absolute bar to the recovery of a judgment,7 2 the failure to file a claim

against the estate within the six month statutory claim period does not
operate as an absolute bar to the debt. 73 Its only effect is to prevent any
participation in the assets of the estate previously inventoried by the executor
and the claimant may only have his debt satisfied out of noninventoried or

subsequently inventoried property, if any. 74 Since the executor is required
to file an inventory of assets discovered any time after the decedent's death,

the courts have interpreted the intention of this section to be to allow a

debtor who has neglected to present his claim against the estate within the
statutory period, to seek satisfaction out of any property belonging to the
estate which has not been previously inventoried. 75 In order for a creditor
he still must
to benefit from any subsequently inventoried assets, however,
76
have his claim filed with and allowed by the probate court.

The question presented in Hagmann and the Revenue Rulings cannot
be readily answered when related to the applicable section of the Illinois

statute. In those situations, the Florida and Mississippi statutes provided for
See
71. Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Il1. 124, 128, 46 N.E. 197, 198 (1897).
Kittredge v. Nicholes, 162 Ill. 410, 44 N.E. 742 (1896) where the debtor, the holder
of a note against the decedent secured by a trust deed on real estate, had two remedies
for the collection of his debt and could either file a claim against the estate in the probate court based on his note or foreclose the trust deed. The fact that he failed to file
his claim in the probate court within the statutory period had no effect on his right to
pursue his other remedy.
This interpretation of this section of the Probate Act was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Pufahl v. Estate of Parks, where the Court
held that a claim by the receiver of a national bank against a former stockholder was subject to the time limitation provision . . . of the Illinois Probate
Act, and since it was not filed within the time prescribed therein, the claim,
though not barred, could not be satisfied against inventoried assets, but only
against subsequently discovered assets. The court did not regard the provision
as a general statute of limitations.
In re Estate of Bird, 410 Ill. 390, 395, 102 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1951) (citation omitted).
72. E.g., Sanders v. Merchants' State Bank, 349 Ill. 547, 566, 182 N.E. 897, 904
(1932); Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Ill. 124, 128, 46 N.E. 197, 198 (1897); Shepard v.
Nat'l Bank, 67 Ill. 292, 294 (1873); Bradford v. Jones, 17 Ill. 93, 94 (1855).
73. E.g., Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Ill. 124, 129, 46 N.E. 197, 199 (1897); Messenger v. Rutherford, 80 Ill.App.2d 25, 29, 225 N.E.2d 94, 97 (1967); Alderson v. Alderson's Estate, 226 Ill.App. 176, 178 (1922).
74. E.g., Ryan v. Jones, 15 Ill. 1, 5 (1853); Sloo v. Pool, 15 111. 47, 48 (1853).
75. E.g., Bradford v. Jones, 17 Ill. 93, 94 (1855). Although this case was decided
under a statute which placed the burden upon the debtor to find any inventoried assets,
the intent of both statutes is the same.
76. E.g., Wingate v. Pool, 25 Ill. 118, 122 (1860).
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an absolute bar to payment by the executor. In other words, those statutes
were general statutes of limitation. Section 204 of the Illinois Act, however,
does not provide an absolute bar to payment of claims not filed within the
six month statutory claim period. Rather, these claims are only barred as to
that part of the estate which has been inventoried. It should be noted,
nevertheless, that section 204 does eventually provide for a general statute of
limitation by providing that all claims which are barrable under this section
are ultimately barred three years after the decedent's death.
Therefore, if a fact situation similar to the ones considered in Hagmann
and the Revenue Rulings were to occur in Illinois, it is uncertain whether the
same result would be reached under the applicable section of the Illinois
statute. This dilemma can best be analyzed in terms of the following
hypothetical example.
A died testate while domiciled in Illinois and the only two items in his
gross estate were a bank deposit of $20,000 in his name alone, an inventory
asset, and a bank deposit of $150,000 which was payable on his death
directly to the decedent's surviving spouse and thus a noninventory asset.
Letters of office were issued in Illinois. At his death A was indebted in the
amount of $19,000 to an unsecured creditor, B, who did not file his claim
with the probate court within the six month statutory claim period. Less
than six .month's after A's death, however, B informally asserted his claim
against the executor of A's estate and it was promptly paid out of the
property which had been inventoried within six months from the issuance of
letters. Since payment of the claim had been approved by the beneficiaries
of the estate, the claim was deducted on the federal estate tax return filed on
behalf of A's estate.
According to the position taken by the IRS in Hagmann and the Revenue Rulings, events subsequent to the decedent's death will be considered and the claim will be barred as to the estate inventoried within six
months from the issuance of letters under section 204 of the Act because the
creditor had not filed the claim within the six month statutory period.
Therefore, in spite of the fact that the debt was a bona fide, personal
obligation at the date of the decedent's death, the debt would not be
deductible under either section 2053(a)(3) of the Code, because it is not
one considered allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the
estate was administered, or section 20.2053-4 of the Treasury Regulations,
because it was not a claim enforceable against the decedent's estate.
Application of the IRS position is not this clear-cut, however, because
neither Hagmann nor the Revenue Rulings are controlling in Illinois and
because of the contrary decision reached in Russell,77 which is controlling
until overruled. Since the claim was allowable under local law at the time of

77. See text at notes 36-44 supra.
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the decedent's death, the court in Russell reasoned that a deduction should
be allowed even though it had not been timely presented to the probate
court. 78 Significantly, the court declined to follow Revenue Ruling 60-247,
the first ruling to express IRS agreement with Jacobs that events subsequent
to the decedent's death should be considered when valuing claims against the
decedent's estate.79
Therefore, under Russell allowability is to be determined as of the decedent's death and the fact that the claim later becomes
unenforceable because of tardiness in filing is immaterial.
Since Russell is the only case construing section 204 of the Act and
since it is only a district court decision, it is unclear whether Russell is still
good law in light of Hagmann and the Revenue Rulings. If, however,
Hagmann, and thus Jacobs, become controlling on the question of how
events subsequent to the decedent's death should affect the valuation of
claims against the estate, Russell will be overruled upon consideration by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Nevertheless, until overturned,
Russell constitutes controlling precedent but the paying of unfiled claims by
the executor does run the risk of disallowance by the IRS.
Even though the beneficiaries of the estate in the hypothetical example
approved payment of the claim, which had not been filed with the probate
court within six months after the issuance of letters, before the statutory
claim period had run, according to the IRS position in Hagmann and the
Revenue Rulings, it still would not be deductible on the federal estate tax
return under either section 2053(a) (3) of the Code or section 20.2053-4 of
the Treasury Regulations. This is because section 203 of the Act8 ° has
been construed by the Illinois Supreme Court to mean that the representative
may be personally charged if he pays an unfiled and invalid claim. 8 '
In
addition, the Illinois courts have construed section 204 of the Act to mean
that neither the probate court, 82 nor the executor, 3 nor the attorney for the
estate,8 4 nor the distributees or legatees of the estate8 5 can waive filing of a
78. 260 F. Supp. at 499.
79. See text at notes 55-59 supra.
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 203 (1973) (now § 18-11), in pertinent part, reads
as follows:
Payment before Allowance
If a representative pays a claim before it is allowed, the court may require

him to establish the validity ... of the claim before he is credited therewith.
81. E.g., Walker v. Diehl, 79 Ill. 473, 476 (1875); In re Estate of Nonnast, 300
Ill.App. 537, 560, 21 N.E.2d 796, 807 (1939), modified on other grounds, 374 Ill. 248,
29 N.E.2d 251 (1940).
82. E.g., Bosnak v. Murphy, 28 Ill.App.2d 110, 114, 170 N.E.2d 640, 643 (1960);
In re Estate of Nomast, 300 ll.App. 537, 560, 21 N.E.2d 796, 807 (1939), modified on
other grounds, 374 Ill. 248, 29 N.E.2d 251 (1940).
83. E.g., Bosnak v. Murphy, 28 IH.App.2d 110, 114, 170 N.E.2d 640, 643 (1961);
In re Estate of Nonnast, 300 Ill.App. 537, 560, 21 N.E.2d 796, 807 (1939), modified
on other grounds, 374 Ill. 248, 29 N.E.2d 251 (1940).
84. E.g., Abrams v. Schlar, 27 Ill.App.2d 237, 240, 169 N.E.2d 583, 585 (1960).
85. E.g., Austin v. City Bank of Milwaukee, 288 Ill.App. 36, 42, 5 N.E.2d 585,
588 (1936); Alderson v. Alderson's Estate, 226 Ill.App. 176, 179 (1922).
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claim within the time fixed by this section. Since no one can waive the filing
of a claim, if an executor does pay a claim which has not been filed with the
probate court within the statutory claim period, these payments may be
surcharged to him8 6 and the claim will not be allowed. Because an unfiled
creditor's claim paid with the approval of the beneficiaries of the decedent's
estate is not allowable under Illinois law, it would not be an enforceable
claim against the estate under section 20.2053 of the Treasury Regulations
and therefore, would not be allowable as a deduction under section 2053 of
the Code.
This does not mean, however, that under Illinois law claims not filed
within the six months statutory claim period are never deductible on the
decedent's federal estate tax return. If the facts in the hypothetical example
were as follows, the results would be different.
B, the claimant who had not filed his claim with the probate court
within six months after the issuance of letters, was not paid by the executor
out of inventoried property after approval by the beneficiaries of the estate.
Instead, the decedent's surviving spouse paid the creditor the $19,000 owed
by the decedent out of the bank deposit payable on his death directly to her,
before the executor filed the federal estate tax return.
Under these circumstances, the estate could claim a deduction for the
claim which had been paid even though it had not been filed with the
probate court. Since claims barred under section 204 of the Act are only
barred as to inventoried assets and since the determination as to which
property is and is not subject to claims is made under the applicable state
law, claims otherwise barred under section 204 may be paid out of noninventoried assets and still be deductible. This is because section 2053(c) (2)
of the Code and section 20.2053-1(c) of the Treasury Regulations allow
the amount paid out of property included in the gross estate but not subject
to claims to be deducted if actually paid within the time allowed for the filing
of the federal estate tax return under section 6075 of the Code (nine
months) or within any extension of time for filing the return granted under
section 6081 of the Code.8 7 Therefore, the allowable deduction is the
amount that is payable out of property subject to claims and is actually paid
from any source in the gross estate but cannot exceed the value of the
property subject to claims plus the amount actually paid out of property not
subject to claims before the return is filed.
Under the last hypothetical example, the fact that section 204 of the
Act does not create an absolute bar to payment of claims not filed within the
six month statutory claim period is extremely significant. If this section had
86. E.g., In re Estate of Nonnast, 300 I1.App. 537, 560, 21 N.E.2d 796, 807
(1939), modified on other grounds, 374 Ill. 248, 29 N.E.2d 251 (1940).
87. See note 7 supra.
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created a general statute of limitation, as was the case in Hagmann and
Revenue Rulings 75-24 and 75-177, according to the IRS position claims not
filed within the six month statutory claim period would have been void and,
therefore, could not have been paid out of noninventoried assets and could
not have been deductible. The distinction that under section 204 unfiled
claims may not be paid out of inventoried assets is only important, however,
if the gross estate consists of both inventoried and noninventoried assets.
If the gross estate includes only inventoried assets, then Hagmann and
the Revenue Rulings are directly on point. Since events subsequent to the
decedent's death are to be considered in valuing claims against the decedent's estate under the IRS position, claims in Illinois which subsequently
become unenforceable because they were not filed with the probate court
within the six month statutory claim period are not deductible for federal
estate tax purposes. However, under the Revenue Rulings, the opposite
result would be reached if section 204 of the Act were amended to allow that
the executor might pay from the estate any claim against the decedent's
estate inventoried within six months after the issuance of letters, even though
the claim has not been filed with the probate court within six months from
the issuance of letters, when the payment has been approved by the heirs or
beneficiaries adversely affected or accounted for in accountings to the court
and when the payment is made within six months from the issuance of
letters.88 If such an amendment were adopted, it would not be necessary to
file every claim with the probate court. Thus, if the executor paid an
unfiled claim within six months and either received the approval of the
beneficiaries of the estate or accounted for it in his First Current Account to
the probate court, then under section 20.2053 of the Treasury Regulations,
such a claim would be allowable under Illinois law, would be enforceable,
and would, therefore, be allowable as a deduction under section 2053 of the
Code.
CONCLUSION

There is no definitive answer to the question whether the estate is
entitled to a deduction under section 2053(a)(3) of the Code for debts
which were bona fide obligations at the date of the decedent's death but
which have become unenforceable under state law. If the Ithaca Trust
rationale has been adopted in the jurisdiction, the fact that the claim has
subsequently become unenforceable does not matter and the debt is deductible. If the Jacobs rationale has been adopted, however, then such a
subsequent event is determinative and the claim will not be deductible. Since
the IRS has adopted the facobs rationale, the effect of decisions which have
adopted Ithaca Trust is uncertain.
88. See FLA. ANN. STAT. § 733.16 (Supp. 1974), amending FLA. ANN. SrAT. §
733.16 (1969).
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At this moment, if an Illinois executor is administering an estate
composed of only inventoried assets, in order to avoid the possibility of
having a claim disallowed as a deduction, he should have it filed with the
probate court within six months from the issuance of letters. This means
that every debt of a decedent, no matter how large or small, would have to
be filed with the probate court before payment could be made. If, however,
the Illinois legislature amended section 204 of the Act as indicated,8 9 then
the Illinois executor would have two alternatives:
(1) obtaining the
approval of all the beneficiaries of the estate before paying the claim within
six months from the issuance of letters, or (2) listing the claim as a
disbursement in his First Current Account filed with the probate court. In
lieu of action by the United States Congress, action by the Illinois legislature
is the only way to avoid having the courts flooded with claims because,
according to the IRS position, every claim must be filed with the probate
court in an estate composed only of inventoried assets in order for it to be
deductible on the federal estate tax return.
LYNN A. GOLDSTEBIN
89. See text at note 88 supra.

